Where Is South East Queensland’s Property Market Heading in 2026?
By Tim AllenBuyer’s Agent and Director, IPS Buyer’s Agents


I have never liked people who claim they can predict the future. Markets surprise us, headlines change quickly and no single chart can tell us the exact month that values will rise or fall.
I still use the 18.6-year land cycle as a way to ask better questions. It helps me look for late-cycle behaviour, debt pressure, supply constraints, buyer confidence and global risks. It does not give me a date for a crash, and it should never replace sound due diligence.
As at October 2026, the national market has moved into a softer phase. South East Queensland has also pulled back from its recent peak, but the data does not support a simple “everything is crashing” story. Brisbane still has population growth, a constrained supply pipeline and a major decade of infrastructure delivery ahead of it.
That is why my view remains balanced: buyers should respect the risks, but they should not ignore the long-term reasons people want to live, work and invest in South East Queensland.
The 18.6-Year Land Cycle Is a Useful Lens
Land-cycle commentators argue that property and credit markets often move in long waves, with a typical cycle lasting about 18.6 years. The pattern is interesting, but it is not a scientific clock. Every period has different interest rates, lending rules, population flows, tax settings, construction capacity and global events.
The value of this lens is not in forecasting one precise turning point. Its value is in avoiding complacency. When prices have risen strongly, buyers should test the numbers harder, keep a buffer and choose an asset with lasting owner-occupier appeal.
18.6-Year Property Cycle Timeline and Current Reading
The table below keeps the original timeline, adds historically defensible mid-cycle events where the earlier version left gaps, corrects dates that did not support a slowdown label and treats the current window as a scenario to watch rather than a promised outcome. Where the historical record does not support a neat cycle match, I have stated the uncertainty rather than force an event into the pattern. Business-cycle durations vary substantially.[10][15]
| Peak and correction period | Mid-cycle slowdown | Major event or market context | Verified mid-cycle event or context | October 2026 reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1818–1819 | 1828–1829† | Panic of 1819 and US land-speculation bust | A short US trade contraction is sometimes placed here, but the dating is disputed. This is not labelled as a major panic. | Historic reference point |
| 1836–1837 | 1847–1848 | Panic of 1837 and a prolonged international depression | British commercial and banking crisis in 1847; credit stress followed corn-price speculation and the government authorised additional Bank of England liquidity. European revolutionary upheaval in 1848 was a separate continental shock.[11] | Historic reference point |
| 1854–1857 | 1866–1867 | Panic of 1857 financial crisis | Panic of 1866 / Overend Gurney crisis. The large London discount house suspended payment on “Black Friday”; the Bank of England supported viable banks and brokers.[12] | Historic reference point |
| 1872–1873 | 1882–1884 | Long Depression begins | US recession from March 1882 to May 1885, including the more locally contained New York Panic of 1884.[10][13] | Historic reference point |
| 1890–1891 | 1899–1901 (date refined) | Australian land boom and bust | US recession from June 1899 to December 1900, followed by a New York-centred panic in 1901. The 1899 start date is more precise.[10][13] | Historic reference point |
| 1925–1929 | May 1937–June 1938 (corrected) | Great Depression | A severe US mid-recovery recession. The Second Sino-Japanese War began in 1937 and World War II began in Europe in September 1939, after the recession; neither is presented as its cause.[10][14] | Historic reference point |
| 1954–1955 | 1960–1961 (corrected) | Post-war boom and market adjustment | Australia’s 1960–61 recession / credit squeeze is the better reference. The RBA described 1962–63 as a recovery period from recession; 1963–64 should not be labelled an official slowdown.[15][16] | Historic reference point |
| 1972–1974 | 1981–1982 | Oil crisis and property correction | High inflation and tight monetary policy led to the July 1981–November 1982 US recession and Australia’s 1982–83 recession.[10][15] | Historic reference point |
| 1989–1992 (date refined) | 2000–2001 | Japanese asset-bubble collapse unfolded from the early 1990s.[17] | Dot-com bust, US recession from March to November 2001 and the 11 September attacks.[10] | Historic reference point |
| 2006–2008 | September 2019–August 2020 | Global Financial Crisis | Repo-market stress, global rate cuts, COVID-19 lockdowns and stimulus | Historic reference point |
| 2025–2027 (cycle window) | 2036–2038 (hypothesis) | Current period; not a confirmed crash forecast | Too far ahead to assess | National values were 3.6% below their March 2026 peak at 31 August 2026. Brisbane values were 2.7% below their May 2026 peak, while still 10.8% higher over the year.[1] |
†The 1828–1829 timing remains a tentative historical marker rather than a definitive named recession or panic.
The current row matters because it keeps us honest. Cotality reported that the national Home Value Index fell 0.9% in August 2026 and 3.1% over the preceding three months. Brisbane fell 1.0% in August and 2.7% over the quarter. At the same time, Brisbane values remained 10.8% higher over 12 months, with a median dwelling value of $1,080,142.[1]
This is a correction and a change in buyer conditions. It is not proof that the 18.6-year theory caused the change, or that a severe national crash must follow.
Cotality describes a broader national slowdown, with softer buyer demand, more stock and longer selling times. Those conditions give well-prepared buyers more room to negotiate.[1]
For a Brisbane buyer’s agent, the practical message is simple. Do not chase every listing because you fear missing out. Compare recent settled sales, assess the number of competing buyers, inspect the street and understand the local supply pipeline. A better negotiating environment still does not turn a poor-quality property into a sound purchase.
I would be especially careful with property that has weak land content, flood exposure, poor access, a large nearby apartment pipeline, major maintenance issues or limited owner-occupier appeal. In a softer market, buyers can take more time to choose well.
The original article used approximate annual demand ranges. I have kept those historical ranges so readers can follow the original discussion, but I have refreshed the completion figures with a consistent ABS calendar-year series. The 2024 row uses the National Housing Supply and Affordability Council’s directly comparable annual demand and completion estimates.
These figures are a useful national context, not a precise annual measure of every local shortage. The historical demand ranges and the later official measures use different methods, so readers should not add the rows together as one exact cumulative shortfall.
| Year | Homes needed or demand benchmark | New dwelling completions | Shortfall / (surplus) or current note |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | 190,000–200,000* | 152,327 | 37,673–47,673 shortfall versus the legacy range |
| 2014 | 190,000–200,000* | 175,174 | 14,826–24,826 shortfall versus the legacy range |
| 2015 | 190,000–210,000* | 195,442 | 5,442 surplus to 14,558 shortfall versus the legacy range |
| 2016 | 190,000–210,000* | 211,120 | 1,120–21,120 surplus versus the legacy range |
| 2017 | 190,000–210,000* | 211,274 | 1,274–21,274 surplus versus the legacy range |
| 2018 | 190,000–210,000* | 217,966 | 7,966–27,966 surplus versus the legacy range |
| 2019 | 190,000–210,000* | 201,022 | 11,022 surplus to 8,978 shortfall versus the legacy range |
| 2020 | 180,000–200,000* | 180,205 | 205 surplus to 19,795 shortfall versus the legacy range |
| 2021 | 190,000–210,000* | 177,396 | 12,604–32,604 shortfall versus the legacy range |
| 2022 | 200,000–220,000* | 173,340 | 26,660–46,660 shortfall versus the legacy range |
| 2023 | 200,000–220,000* | 175,789 | 24,211–44,211 shortfall versus the legacy range |
| 2024 | 223,000 underlying demand | 177,000 | 46,000 shortfall[2] |
| 2025 | About 175,000 projected annual underlying-demand rate from 2025–26 | 172,642 | About 2,400 below that forecast rate; this is not an official published annual gap[2][3] |
| 2026 (January–June only) | Full-year demand not yet available on a comparable basis | 86,153 | Half-year completion figure only; do not annualise it[3] |
*Legacy approximate ranges from the original article, retained for continuity. ABS completion figures are revised original-series calendar-year totals for new houses and other new residential dwellings.[3]
The latest official national assessment shows why supply remains important. The Council reported 177,000 completions against estimated underlying demand of 223,000 in 2024. It then forecast 938,000 gross completions across the five Housing Accord years ending 30 June 2029, 262,000 below the 1.2 million target. After demolitions, it projected net new supply of 825,000 dwellings, or 79,000 fewer homes than expected underlying demand.[2]
This does not mean every SEQ suburb will rise at the same rate. It means buyers should investigate where additional supply can land and whether a property benefits from genuine scarcity.
The migration table now uses a single ABS financial-year series. That gives a cleaner comparison than mixing calendar years, estimates and early pandemic commentary. ABS marks the 2024–25 result as preliminary.[4]
| Financial year ended 30 June | Net overseas migration (NOM) |
|---|---|
| 2012–13 | 230,330 |
| 2013–14 | 187,780 |
| 2014–15 | 184,030 |
| 2015–16 | 206,230 |
| 2016–17 | 263,350 |
| 2017–18 | 238,220 |
| 2018–19 | 241,340 |
| 2019–20 | 192,700 |
| 2020–21 | -84,940 |
| 2021–22 | 207,910 |
| 2022–23 | 538,340 |
| 2023–24 | 429,160 |
| 2024–25 (preliminary) | 305,570 |
Source: ABS Overseas Migration, 2024–25.[4]
Migration has eased from the post-pandemic high, but it still adds meaningful demand for housing. Queensland recorded a net overseas migration gain of 55,740 people in 2024–25.[4] Population is not the only driver of property values, but it affects rental demand, local services, household formation and the depth of the buyer pool.
A correction can still occur in SEQ. I do not think the region is immune from higher rates, weak confidence, job losses or a global shock. My view is that the Brisbane 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games, plus the infrastructure Queensland must deliver around them, should help cushion South East Queensland relative to areas without the same long-term investment pipeline.
This is not just a stadium story. The Queensland Government’s 2032 Delivery Plan identifies 14 new or upgraded venues across the state and acceleration of key connections. The program includes The Wave extension to Sunshine Coast Airport, faster rail to the Gold Coast, new Brisbane stations, Brisbane Metro expansion and critical Bruce Highway upgrades.[5]
The Commonwealth–Queensland agreement also confirms a $7.1 billion Games Venue Infrastructure Program for 17 new and upgraded venues. The Commonwealth notes a separate $12.4 billion transport investment in Queensland, including Bruce Highway upgrades, faster Gold Coast rail and stage one of Direct Sunshine Coast Rail between Beerwah and Caloundra.[6]
That matters across the region:
- Brisbane will host the main stadium and National Aquatic Centre and receive supporting transport upgrades.
- Gold Coast benefits from the planned faster rail connection to Brisbane.
- Sunshine Coast has The Wave and Direct Sunshine Coast Rail in the Games-related transport picture.
- Moreton Bay, Logan and Redlands Coast have venue and wider regional-access connections that deserve local due diligence.
- Ipswich and other growth corridors can benefit from employment, population and infrastructure spill-over, but buyers still need to check local supply, flood risk and transport access suburb by suburb.
The delivery plan forecasts a $4.6 billion increase in tourism and trade under the global spotlight of the Games. Forecasts are not guarantees, but they show why 2032 can change how the world sees Queensland.[5]
Brisbane does not need the Games to be a liveable city, but the Games will place it in front of a global audience. The EIU’s 2026 Global Liveability Index rates 173 cities on stability, healthcare, culture and environment, education and infrastructure, and three Australian cities made its top ten: Melbourne (3rd), Sydney (4th) and Adelaide (8th).[7] Brisbane has scored highly on the same measures before: in the EIU’s 2015 ranking of 140 cities, it placed 18th with an overall score of 94.2 out of 100.[8]
A liveability ranking does not create capital growth by itself. However, a city with strong lifestyle credentials, a warm climate, employment opportunities, education, transport investment and international visibility has a credible case for attracting residents, visitors and businesses over time.
Queensland’s planning framework expects SEQ to reach about six million people by 2046, adding around 2.2 million people from 2021. It also expects households to become smaller and more diverse, which increases the need for a broader range of homes.[9]
For me, that is the real 2032 story. The Games could accelerate attention, but the lasting question is whether SEQ builds the housing, transport, services and jobs that people need after the closing ceremony.
I would keep an eye on five things rather than relying on one dramatic headline:
- Interest rates and borrowing capacity. Higher repayments affect what buyers can pay, even when supply stays tight.
- Employment and household confidence. Stable employment reduces the risk of distressed selling. A weaker labour market can change sentiment quickly.
- Listings, days on market and vendor discounting. These measures tell us more about a local market than a national headline.
- New supply by suburb. Check approved apartments, land releases, infrastructure works and competing stock within a realistic drive time.
- Infrastructure delivery. Track contracts, planning approvals and construction progress rather than pricing in an announcement alone.
A buyer who understands the local numbers can act with more confidence than a buyer trying to time every interest-rate move or global event.
A South East Queensland buyer’s agent should do more than open doors. We help clients test the purchase price, assess risks, compare locations and negotiate without letting emotion run the deal.
Using an independent buyer’s agent in Australia can often save buyers thousands of dollars through strategic negotiation and market insights, though the claim that buyers automatically or universally pay 3% to 5% less is a general marketing estimate rather than a guaranteed rule.
For owner-occupiers, investors, first-home buyers and rentvestors, the important work happens before the offer. We look at the local buyer pool, property condition, flood and planning overlays, comparable sales, rental evidence and the likely appeal to future owner-occupiers.
If you are deciding whether to buy where you live or follow a different investment strategy, read our rentvesting guide. If you want a realistic explanation of private opportunities, see how genuine off-market access works in Brisbane. You can also compare local markets through our South East Queensland suburb reports.
As a Brisbane buyer’s agent working across Moreton Bay, Redlands Coast, Logan, Ipswich, the Gold Coast and the Sunshine Coast, I believe local knowledge matters more in a changing market. Two suburbs can sit only 10 minutes apart and have very different supply, flood, transport and buyer-demand profiles.
My 2025 view was that a national slowdown or downturn could arrive, while Brisbane and South East Queensland could prove more resilient because of undersupply, population growth and Brisbane 2032 infrastructure. The October 2026 data shows that the market has softened, so buyers should not pretend risk has disappeared.
I still do not expect the same impact in SEQ as in markets with weaker population growth, less infrastructure investment or far more available supply. Brisbane 2032 will require major delivery across roads, rail, stations, venues and community facilities. The Games will also put Brisbane and South East Queensland on show to the world. That exposure can attract more visitors, students, workers, businesses and future residents after 2032.
But the Games do not make every property a good purchase. We need to buy the right property, on the right terms, in the right location and with enough financial buffer to hold through a softer period.
These are my thoughts, based on what I am seeing in the market and the evidence available today. I am not an economist. I am a small-business owner, property investor, mortgage broker and buyer’s agent with more than two decades of experience. — Tim Allen
This article shares Tim Allen’s personal market view and general information only. It does not provide financial, legal, tax, accounting or personal investment advice. Property markets can rise or fall, infrastructure plans can change and individual outcomes depend on personal circumstances. Seek advice from appropriately licensed professionals before making a property or investment decision.
- Cotality — Home Value Index, September 2026 (results to 31 August 2026)
- National Housing Supply and Affordability Council — State of the Housing System 2025 (media release, 21 May 2025)
- Australian Bureau of Statistics — Building Activity, Australia, June 2026
- Australian Bureau of Statistics — Overseas Migration, 2024–25 financial year
- Queensland Government — The 2032 Delivery Plan
- Australian Government — 2032 Games infrastructure funding deal confirmed (3 July 2025)
- EIU — Global Liveability Index 2026
- EIU — Liveability ranking and overview, August 2015
- Queensland Government — Addressing land supply and growth challenges in South East Queensland
- National Bureau of Economic Research — US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions
- Economic History Society — How the Bank of England managed the financial crisis of 1847
- Bank of England — The demise of Overend Gurney (Quarterly Bulletin 2016 Q2)
- Federal Reserve History — Banking Panics of the Gilded Age
- Federal Reserve History — Recession of 1937–38
- Reserve Bank of Australia — Recession (explainer)
- Reserve Bank of Australia — Annual Report 1963: Australian Economic and Financial Conditions
- Bank of Japan (IMES) — The Asset Price Bubble and Monetary Policy: Japan’s Experience in the Late 1980s and the Lessons
